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IN'rRODTJCTION

The Odyss(e y of Consciousness
The System of Transcendental Id,e alism , written late
in l'799 and published .in 1800, is by far the most
polished ,a nd compl,e te of the works that sc:helling pub
lished -wlt.bin his lifetime ,. In its :b readth, clarity and
integrity the 'Work justifies the sudden fame it bro,u gbt
its young author. Ironically , this work which for 't he
next decad,e ,e stablished Schelling's position at the pin
nacl,e of German philosophy and pr,o vided him the pl,atf,o rm
for eLa'b orating the first system of absolut~ idealism 'i:s
far f:ro:m the most original of his writings~ l
I :n th,e
main, it belongs to the early work,s, the phi.los,o phical
apprenticeship undrer Fichte. The system, in ,f a,c 't" main,
tains its conti'n uity with the r ,e st of Sche.1 1:i ng 's philo·
sophy only in its muted voicing of certain themes which
elsewher,e attain thei,r proper development--thermes :sud'!
as the r ,e ali ty and ultimacy ,o f nature .:in an idealist.i,c
perspective, natur,e ' s function as the grouin d and anti
type of spirit, the self-identity of the il\bsolwte wit:hin
rdispersed finite being, the coinrceptua.l though uncon
scious ,e lem,e nt in art, and philosophy's tasrk of constriu.rct
ing .a g,e neral metaphy.s ics upon the model of tnnna:n f ,r ,eedom.
It is pr,e dominantly a work of ,o onsolidatio,n , not of
Schelling ' s own p:r,e vi,o us philosophy ., but of the t:raditi,o n
of transcendental idealism, the posilt ion sugigested in
Ka:n t is three Critiques and el,e vated into an epistemolo,gy
a jn d ,general methodology in Fi,c ht,e 's Science of K1n owled,g e.
Schelling is cle,a r on the kind of consolidation nee,d ed~
The most g,e neral proof of the over.all ideali ty
of knowledge is therefore that carried out in the
Science of Knowledge, by immediate i :n fe.r ence from
the proposition I am. There Ls yet another proof
of it possible, however, namely, the factual,, which
in ·a ,s yst,em o .f transce\n dental id,.e ;alism is carried
out in the very process of actually deducing t!he
entire 'System of knowledge from the principle in
question.
(System, p. 34}
1

1 schelling's System became known to the English-speaking wor.Ld
throug1h Colerirdge•s Biograp!hia Liter,a ria, which drew heavily upon
i t and othe·r ,e arly essays ,o f Schellin g :f or a ·f orty,- page critique of
p:ercep,bual realism.. The .a da,ptati,o n t.oo'k the :fonn both of d,i rect
transl,atlon and of paraphrase, with scant admowLedgeme.nt o.f the
exact sources,. The criti,c 's laxity late·r ,g ave rise to charges of
plagiarism, For a comparison of Ooleridge•s be:xt and its sources
,s e,e G. Ot'sini 1 Co1,e ,d Ldge and Ge.r:man Idealism (Carbondale , Ill. .,
196'9) , pp.. ].98-2:21.
1
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Schelling's predecessors had enunciated the principle
that the togetherness of subject and object, of presenta
tion and thing, can be founded only in self-consciousness
or its constitutive activity, imagination. Fichte called
this unitive consciousness the 'self' or the 'I.' What
remains is to erove this theoretical position, to see the
abstract principle of the subjectivity of all known being
verified in a system of idealism . This system would give
flesh and substance to the stance of a perceptual and
cognitive idealism by demonstrating that the objective
world in the totality of its being and its operations is
a process of emergence from the self and its activities,
~ most basicafly presentation.
The world in its objectivity,
in its sensible singularity and its generality as nature,
and also this objectivity spiritualized as the human
community living under law, subject to time and history-
this whole world is to be constructed from the self's
fundamental quality, fr~edom or activity. "Freedom is
the one principle on which everything is supported, and
what we behold in the objective world is not anything
present outside us, but merely the inner limitation of
our own free activity" (p. 35). The system Schelling
proposes is to annex to the idealism of this epistemo
logical and metaphysical principle a 'real-philosophy,'
a total and faithful account of the objectivity of the
physical world and of the human structures of experience
and social sharing. Or better, its task is to prove the
identity of transcendental idealism and real-philosophy,
and thus to elevate transcendental philosophy into an
'ideal-realism' (p. 41) .
In his 1827 Munich lectures Towards a History of
Recent Philosophy Schelling reluctantly underscores the
non-originality of his 1800 System, its dependence on
"Fichtean Idealism" and on the principle first enun
ciated by Fichte that freedom must ground all philosophy,
For it was Fichte who discovered that the Kantian auton- .
orny of self founds not only practical or moral philosophy
but also theoretical philosophy, the account of knowledge
and being (S.W., X, 96) ,2 But the one-time disciple and
popularizer"ot Fichte now maintains that he came to his
own method while working under this "cloak of Fichtean
thought."3 The essence of this method consists in the
clarification "of that which is utterly independent of
our freedom, the presentation of an objective world which
~on-English Schelling references are to the Samtliche
Werke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling, 1856 f., reproduced in the Munich
Jubilee Edition, ed. M, Sc hroter, 1927 . The first nume ral indicates
the volume, the second the page.
3schelling definitively broke from Fichte in 1806, though
the two were in substantial disagreement from 1800 on.
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indeed restricts our freedom, through a process in which
the self sees itself develop through a necessary but not
consciously observed act of self-positing" (S .W., X, 97).
This process, unnamed in 1800, is now given the name
dialectic--Schelling insinuates that credit for the dis
covery of "the dialectic" is popularly misplaced,
In this dialectic or clarificatory process the
PQSiting and self-expanding activity of the self and the
limitation of that activity are seen to be both and
~ually the self's activity. · The self is pr'IinorcITally
th activity and limitation; inside the process i t con
sciously makes itself to be both, i.e., the self itself
makes itself to be both subject and object, finite and
infinite. The self is doubled in that it appears to
itself; it loses the abstract simplicity of the Fichtean
self-positing (I= I); it ceases to be in-itself and
becomes for-itself.
As Schelling explains it in 1827,
inside the dialectical process, which is the system, the
self returns f ~ !_imi tat~~--to _li_s or,igj,naL f_:r_ee.g~nd
for the hrst time becomes for itself (or in the System's
l ~ ccmsc .rou s .1y,--:wna1:-·11:- .:rrre~-- ~ n_ i s e 1 f ,
namely pure freedom or acfivity :- Schelling further
remark's'1: at th1 one process makes up the whole mechanism
of the system. What in a preceding moment is posited in
consciousness (i.e., is admitted as real) only for the
philosopher, is in the succeeding moment raised in the
self itself; in the end the objective self (the self
itself, the subject of experience) is raised to the
standpoing of philosophizing consciousness and the two
coincide (s.w., x, 98).
That this was indeed Schelling's method and intent
is evident from a reading of the System, though often the
'method' seems a clumsy didactic device and hardly the
simple mirroring of a process inside consciousness. The
claim that this dialectical procedure is his method
rather than Fichte's is plainly extravagant,4 although
the System's main advantage over the Science of Knowledge
is the adoption of this one method over the three or four
that Fichte variously employs.5 It is, at least in
4

Por Fichte's statements on science as the dialectic of the
philosophizing and the objective self see Science of Knowledge, tr.
Heath and Lachs (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 113, 120-21,
198-202. Also see the "Second Introduction to the Science of Know
ledge,"~- cit., sections 5, 7, and particularly 9 and 11.
51n the 1794 Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge
the first three sect~ons on the ground-principles employ a deduc
tive approach; the theoretical philosophy adopts an analytic and
metaphysical method of exploring ·the possible factors inside the
one real synthesis of experience; the cryptic "Deduction of Presen
tation" (pp. 203-17) a descriptive and (abortively) synthetic
method; and the practical philosophy a method at once synthetic
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general form, the same method that Hegel was to take up
and perfect in the Phenomenology of Spirit , and not the
method alone, but the ordering of the strata of experi
ence determined by it. It seems difficult, if not
impossible, to understand the order of experiential
levels in the Phenomenology from Hegel's transitions
alone ·, without the pattern of materials inherited from
Fichte and Schelling before one's eyes. The pattern of
the S?stem indicates the road that Hegel was to follow,
viz. rom theory to praxis, from the individual con
sciousness to the objective social order , and from a
world-embedded consciousness to a philosophically reflec
tive one. But it shows, too, the Kantian and Fichtean
systems which lie at its origin. Here is the System's
basic structure:
(1) A general consideration of self-consciousness,
dialectic and the methodology of the system--Parts I and
II, Part III in part; pages 1-47 .
(2) A theoretical philosophy: the deduction of
cognitive phenomena ranging from rudimentary (and pro
perly unconscious) presentation up to the categories
generally necessary to secure objectivity for experience-
Part III , pages 47-154.
(3)
A (sketchily outlined) philosophy of nature,
contained within the theoretical philosophy, in which
cognitive phenomena are seen of necessity to involve a
reflection and validation in an objective intuited
order, viz. nature--Part III, First Epoch (conclusion)
and Second Epoch; pages 83-129.
(4)
A transcendental analysis of cognitive and
judgmental faculties, aga·in contained within the theore
tical philosophy. Here the previous stages of the self's
activity, viz. as productive intuition and as matter
organized in nature, are seen to be equally grounded in
free reflection or self-relation, the activity which in
practical philosophy e merges on its own as will--Part
III, pages 129-54.
(5) A practical philosophy which advances from the
perceptual and volitional solipsism implicit in the
theoretical standpoint to a deduction of the rational
human community as guarantor both of the objectivity of
· the world of experience and the ideality (value) of the
moral order--Part IV, pages 155-93.
(6)
A philosophy of history contained within the
practical philosophy and evidencing the objectivity of
will, much as the philosophy ~f nature does in the
and genetic--i.e,, once the category of feeling is introduced,
we watch the actual growth of consciousness. Ironically, Fichte
was to criticize the System for a lack of dialectical rigor
(Letter of the Summer of 1801, Fichte-Schelling Br iefwechsel,
ed . w. Schulz [Frankfurt a. M., 1968] , p. 126) .
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theoretical philosophy. Here practical philosophy,
having deduced the moral, legal and political orders of
social existence, finds its subject matter (will)
existing as objectified in history and as necessarily
and collectively moving toward the ideal fulfilment of
world polity--Part IV, pages 193-214.
(7)
An extra-systematic concluding section, in
cluding a (negligently sketched) teleology and a philo
sophy of art, wherein certain abiding problems of the
system, e.g., the inaccessibility of the Absolutely
Identical or absolute self-consciousness, and the recourse
to a hypothesis of a pre-established harmony of freedom
and determinism, receive a solution of sorts. Aesthetic
intuition is seen to be the counterpart of philosophical
intuition and to provide an access to the hidden identity
which was both the ground and the goal of striving for
the consciousness torn throughout the whole dialectic
between intuition and production--Parts V and VI, pages
215-33,
The final section is extra-systematic since on the
Fichtean model of consciousness--an activity ever-de
flected from complete reflection into unconscious and
preconscious production--a fully transparent philosophi
cal moment of self-reflection is not possible. The
philosophy of art, then, stands as a philosophical
epilogue to the System of Transcendental Idealism and the
first announcement of Schelling's own system of absolute
philosophy, the System of Identity.
The System is a rich and intricate work, and we
certainly do not exhaust its significance in mentioning
the pivotal place it occupies in speculative idealism's
march from Fichte to Hegel, nor even in pointing to the
place it holds within Schelling's own philosophical
development. Written at the turn of the century, it
belongs to two different epochs. Its origin lies in the
classic calm of the philosophy of consciousness which
dominated European thought from Descartes through Kant;
its impulse is toward the uneasy philosophies of will
which were to dominate the nineteenth century and which
define man, not in terms of the infinite reach of the
concept timelessly atta i ned in theoria, but in terms of
a dialectic of striving, need and finite fulfilment.
Let us look to some of the central philosophical themes
that the System raises, problems and positions that the
20th Century reader can still appreciate despite the
oddness of, and the general philosophical antipathy
towards, the outlook of speculative idealism.
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The Primacy of the Practical
Like Fichte, his predecessor and exemplar, Schel
ling s .e ts out to render the Kantian philosophy clear and
cogent. Read with an eye turned back to the Kantian
sources, the System seems a compendium of the three
Critiques, an attempt to organize Kant's wayward and
varying assessments of reason's function in intramundane
experience, in moral judgment and in aesthetic/teleologi
cal harmonizations of experience, and to gather them
under one transcendental deduction.6 Like other readers
a.nd interpreters of Kant, Schelling is at times overwhelmed
by the material he is trying to control and seems not so
much to systematize Kant as to be setting didactic exposi
tions of the mechanisms of Kant's understanding alongside
his own dialectical treatment of consciousness. In other
places he is a more successful interpreter: Difficult as
it is, the deduction of presentation as a reality-pro
ducing intuition {Part III, pp. 51-93) clarifies the
mysterious "merely given" character of the Kantian sen
sible manifold. And in his insistence upon the central
role of time in consciousness, upon its being in fact the
basic character of that synthesis 0f the finite and the
infinite which is the self, Schelling rescues Kant's
schematisrn from~ts obscure hiding place in the text of
the First Critique and gives i t its proper prominence.
To someone philosophizing after Kant it could appear
that, over and above the critical results of the examina
tion of reason, and despite all the cautionary notes, a
positive Kantian philosophy was indeed possible. Kant
had left a legacy of positive doctrine pointing in the
direction of a systematic development--for instance, the
ideal of a systematic form for all philosophy and of
philosophy's function"as a metascience, developed in the
Critique's "Architectonic"; the revolutionary notion of
transcendental questioning as a methodology; and, in
texts drawn from theoretical as well as practical philo
sophy, a fully positive description of pure reason,
operating in and for itself, as a function of self
relation.
Following out these hints of Kant, Fichte took the
decisive step toward a speculative criticism in his
apprehension that cognition and action are fundamentally
the same, that an identity, or better, a striving for
identity is the ground and motivation of reason both in
cognition and action. Reason strives for self-coincidence.
6 0n the relation of Fichtean idealism to Kant's texts and
to a possible system of Kantianism drawn from them, see "Second
Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," .92.. cit., pp. 42-62.
See also Schelling, "On the Possibility of a Form of All Philo
sophy," tr. F. Marti, Metaphilosophy, VI, l (1975).
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The unification of sensible experience into a world, and
the further (but for Kant, illicit) unification of
experiential concepts into ideas, are but special cases
of reason's functioning, which is more basically exempli
fied in practical reason's struggle to establish and main
tain autonomy against heteronomy, independence against
external determination, Reason is self-relation and
seeks to maintain identity in the face of otherness-this is Fichte's great insight: He concludes his guest
to define and clarify the objectivity of the mysterious
not-self by saying,
The self, as such, is initially in a state of
reciprocity with itself, and only so does an
external influence upon it become possible,7
And again,
The ultimate ground of all consciousness is an
interaction of the self with itself, by way of a
not-self that has to be regarded from different
points of view.a
Reason as act seeks to find and establish itself in the
other. This is the heart of the Science of Knowledge and
i t is this insight which for Fichte, Schelling and Hegel
determines the primacy of the practical over the theore
tical, the priority of spirit over nature.
It is this
primacy of the practical, the vision that reason is active
rather than passive, that turns transcendental idealism
decisively away from the kind of epistemological and
ontological preoccupations exhibited by even the Kantian
philosophy and toward moral, social and political philo
sophy, and the philosophy of history, The issue every
where is freedom, the relative self-sufficiency of a
finite spirit, rooted firmly in worldly being. The post
Kantian idealists are not concerned to dispute spirit's
anchoring in an objective natural and social world, but
they want to see it interpreted in terms of the suf
ficiency and the life of spirit. They want to view worldly
being and its objectivity, not as an absolute and estab
lished plenum of being, but as a totality relative to
consciousness, as acquiring meaning only in terms of
that relation. It is not mute being but meaning that
is the standard, and not a meaning rooted in brute being
and finding arbitrary expression in language, but a
meaning that stems from activity, from that peculiar
activity of self-consciousness where act and awareness
fully coincide. Thus in Fichte's eyes, and for the
tradition after him, cognition as clarified and explained
by theoretical philosophy is a limited and unsatisfactory
form of self-activity because it is always an activity
7

The Science of Knowledge, p . 244.
8rbid,, p. 248.
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related to an other--until, that is, it is brought by
philosophy to that state wherein it becomes fully self
directed and self-conscious, in will or activity proper.
Both within the System and over the course of his
long speculative career, Schelling is basically in accord
with Fichte in granting priority to praxis rather than to
theory.9 The philosophical system, he insists, is itself
an act of freedom.
It is not a vision of reality passively
received, impressed from without, rather i t is a free
recapitulation of the act of selfhood, the primordial
synthesis (p. 49). Tne philosophical system is primarily
about selfhood and its conditions, and has the basic
character of an act. There is no question, then, of
catching things as they are, of probing the being of things
or of doing any sort of ontology:
"Being, in our system,
is merely freedom suspended" (p. 33). Even the self, the
principle of system itself, is not a thing but a postulate;
i t is not a piece of objectivity lying ready-to-hand, but
something that must be enacted.
"What the self is, is for
that reason no more demonstrable than what the line is; one
can only describe the action whereby i t comes about" (p.
29) •
An idealistic philosophy, so Schelling maintains, can
have only a practical basis; i t is grounded in the free
act of spirit taking itself as central. As such, an
idealistic system is, strictly speaking, without any
purely theoretical basis; it can call upon no primary
datum and educe no proof other than its own free activity.
It must in fact attempt to reduce or re-interpret the whole
theoretical standpoint in light of free activity: Ultimacy
is not to be accorded to the presentation, or to the presen
tation•s objective factor (Kant's sensible manifold), or
even to some final ground of givenness (Kant's thing-in
itself). The System, accordingly, undertakes to explain
givenness itself as an interplay of conscious and uncon
scious activities; i t reads the obviously non-conscious
activity of mechanical and organic nature as equivalent
to willing and action (p. 12 ) . To avoid ceding ultimacy
to objectivity, it has recourse to a pre-established harmony
of sorts, which links free activity and non-conscious pro
duction without engulfing the one factor in the other
(p. 129). So that spirit shall not be lost in a world of
matter and motion, nature is itself spiritualized. Ul
timately the standpoint of cognition itself is abolished,
its distinctness negated: "What is commonly called
theoretical reason is nothing else but imagination in the
9

The one notable departure from his lifelong allegiance to the
practical and spirit-centered orientation of the Fichtean outlook is
the System of Identity of 1801-1806 which is prefigured in the System's
concluding sections on history and art. It seeks a model of being not
in man's activity but in a quantified and formalistic approach to
physical being.
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service of freedom" (p. 176).
In the light of the tenuous nature of Schelling's
allegiance to Fichteanism at the System's writing, one
might be critical of all this emphasis on freedom. He
had, after all , been struggling to articulate a philosophy
of nature within idealism and had not met with Fichte's
approval .
Then, too, the System contains many hints of
the transition to the realistic metaphysics of the System
of Identity, a system patently modelled after Spinoza.
Nonetheless, the emphasis upon freedom is genuine, not
merely a formal repetition of the Science of Knowledge.
From his ea.r liest writings, Schelling was moved by t e
spirit of Kantian freedom to criticize and methodologically
to delimit what then appeared the only consistent meta
physics, Spinozism.
(The center of the critical tradition
always appeared to be its defense of freedom.)
Even in
the System of Identity, inaugurated by a work which adopts
not only the deductive form of Spinoza's Ethics but a good
deal
its naturalistic and deterministic spirit as
well,l freedom is still of capital importance for Schelling:
The existence of quantifiable conceptual shapes (ideas) as
sensible particulars is described as a 'fall' from the
Absolute, an exercise of 'self-will,' a free act.11 Being,
at least in its particular and existential aspects, if not
in its eidetic character, is still conceived as activity
and life.
In the 18 09 Philosophical Investigations of the Nature
of Human Freedom Schelling clearly returned to the pragmatic
or spirit-centered standpoint of the System. He now inter
prets all being, in its objective aspects as well as its
subjective ones, through categories of willing. He out
lines the construction of a total system of philosophy,
ranging from a theory of nature to a philosophy of history,
upon the compl ex interplay of dependence and independence
in human freedom and upon the moral, social and historical
decisiveness of action. "Primordial being is will, 11 main
tains Schelling,12 and, in a deliberately anthropomorphic
move, he :i,dentifies this primal will with the human exer
cise of will. Resorting to the theosophical myth of the
Creation's inherence in a cosmic Adam, Schelling para
doxically makes being's articulation in cosmogony, its
stabilization in nature, and its eventual fulfilment in
history the consequences of the emergence of finite spirit.
All being bears the stamp of the decisiveness first

ob

lOThe Presentation of My Own System, 1801.
llsee the dialogue~ (1802) and Philosophy and Religion
(1804).
1 2 Heidegger has called this statement the turning point in
modern metaphysics. See What Is Called Thinking? tr. Wieck and Gray
(Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 90-91. See also Schellings Abhandlung iiber
das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (Tilbingen, 1971), pp. 114-20.
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attained by human freedom in the creati on of value, in the
fashioning of good and evil. A comment in the System
evokes the kernel of the 1809 essay, where Schelling
suggests that the complex finitude of human consciousness-
involving a possible predetermination of the freely deter
mined, the limitation of freedom due to individuality, and
the influence of other intellects--is thinkable only in
terms of an original act of freedom, an act originative of
ontological as well as moral definiteness, determinative
of character as well as individuality.13
Nor was Schelling's interest in the sovereignty of
freedom exhausted in the 1809 essay. All of his later
work, from the 1815 Ages of the World to the lectures on
mythology and religion of the 1840s and '50s, show
Schelling in search of a principle of freedom and actuality
not confined to and determined by reality as merely con
ceived. Freedom must be more than the activity postulated
by philosophical thought behind the world as presented and
experienced. It must be more than a concept in the domain
of the possible, more than the result of thought dia
lectically playing through all the possible. It must be
the origin, the principle of existence and actuality.
Freedom is the place where thought (as an interplay of con
cepts) leaves off and reality begins. The complete system
of philosophy, as conceived by the late Schelling, faces
a double task--starting from the conceptual, to attain to
freedom and, within thought, to give birth to the actual
and living subject; then, from the side of existence, to
trace its course empirically through history.
In all the phases of his long career, freedom is one
of Schelling's crucial and operative concepts. It is
prior to all categories, beyond the play of the possible
which is the proper concern of metaphysics or theoretical
philosophy--the one reality beyond concepts, beyond naming,
the touchstone by which to judge the rest of the vision
of the universe that a philosophy projects. We know it,
as. Fichte said, because we are it, we do it,14 The actual
takes precedence over the possible, the practical over the
theoretical--not from any conceptual reason or ground, but
from our ~xistence as spirit.
System and Facticity

The System of Transcendental Idealism is above all a
system, an ordering will toward a comprehensive knowledge.
Its single goal, says Schelling, is to discover a system
in human knowledge, to determine the princ iple whereby all
individual knowing is determined (p. 18).
Now i t was Kant who first brought to light the
systematic character of reason and, within the very
13

Seep. 193 below.
14 11 First Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," section l;
..Second Introduction," sections 3 and 4, ~- ~ -
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discussion of the generally misleading character of reason
as a faculty of ideas, underlined its legitimacy. In
addition to its function of unify_ing experiential concepts
into pure concepts or ideas, reason pursues an "ideal:"
It elaborates a complete system of all possible predicates,
arranged in antithetical pairs, and attempts the complete
determination of any being which is its object by assigning
one member of every pair to it.15 Every concrete predica
tion logically presumes this total field of predicates;
conversely the system of predicates presumes the complete
determinacy of every object. Now Kant thinks such a
systematic elaboration of transcendental logic both a
necessary and a valid procedure. Reason can err only in
hypostatizing this ideal, in using it to form the idea of
an - absolutely determined object which embraces the whole
f·ield of predicates, that is to say, God. Later in the
FirS't Critique Kant revises his estimate of the legitimacy
of the notion of system. Rather than perceiving it as
proceeding to an unwarranted hypostatization in the idea
of an absolute object, he sees it as the defining and
guiding ideal of philosophy. Under this ideal philosophy
seeks to combine all systems of knowledge, i.e., all
sciences, into one "system of human thought."16
Fichte and Schelling indeed set out to regularize
and systematize the Kantian philosophy, not merely in the
sense of bringing the multiplicity of texts (and of
philosophical perspectives too) to some unity, but in the
sense of pursuing this ideal of reaso.n . Reason--the self
as autonomous in the practical sphere, if not in the
cognitive--must see itself reflected in the totality of
worldly being, must grasp the sum of its self-determinations
as the comprehensive specification of the natural and
i'htersubjective worlds' objectivity. It is this total
reflexivity of reason that Fichte stipulates as the heart
of transcendental idealism:
So what then, in a couple of words, is the import
of the Science of Knowledge? It is this:
reason
is absolutely independent; it exists only for it
self; but for it, too, i t is all that exists.
So
that everything that it is must be founded in
itse.lf and explained solely from itself, and
not from anything outside it .••• 17
Reason is in essence systematic, an ordering and patterning
will to know, a will to discover itsel,f in the known.18
15
critique of Pure Reason, A568-583, B596-6ll.
16Critique of Pure Reason, A832-B39, BB60-867.
17"Second Introduction to the Science of Knowledge," ~- £!!·,
p. 48.

l8see Martin Hei,d egger, Schellings Abhandlung iiber das Wesen
der menschlichen Freiheit,~- cit., pp. 31-41.
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Schelling initiated his reflections on the possibility
of a system of philosophy in his first philosophical essay,
written in 1794. Looking into the Kantian notion of
system, he sees that system means not only the reduction of
a multiplicity to a unity- -as in Kant ' s categories of the
understanding, which are all specifications of the one
primary concept, relation--but implies a reciprocity of
form and content as well, A system is an organism, as it
were, in which content and form, subject-matter and method
ology, cannot be arbitrarily isolated, but reflect into
one another. This organic reciprocity is the hallmark of
scientific form.
The notion of system becomes doubly important in the
System of Transcendental Idealism, for the work, uncon
sciously documenting Schelling's move from Fichtean idealism
to the "ideal-realism" of the Identity System, has two dis
tinct senses of system in play:
(1) The obvious one,
inherited from Fichte, of an immanent unification of human
knowledge under its principle or guiding process, viz.,
reflexive self-relation; but (2) system also in the sense
of a comprehensive science, a total philosophy comprehending
all the different possible perspectives upon reality.
System in the second sense comprehends and includes the
first, which, limited as it is to the immanent standpoint, ·
is only one portion of the total account. This latter (at
least as described, problematically and ' progranunatically,
in the System) parallels the transcendental system with a
co-equal system of natural science , a philosophy of nature,
and contemplates joining the two through a transcendental
logic, a metaphysical theory of identity and difference;l9
This duality in working notions of system riddles the
whole work and introduces a degree of internal inconsistency .
Despite its massiveness and its detail, the s stem counts
as a transitional work in Schelling's own phi osophical
development, an entr'acte between the Philosophy of Nature
of 1797-1799 and the Identity System of 1801 and thereafter.
The Foreword and Introduction of the System essentially
look back to the philosophy of nature .
They point out
the necessary but complementary opposition between nature
philosophy and transcendental idealism, and suggest that
philosophy can complete its one task, the exhibition of
the work of absolute consciousness, only in a double
manner--in paralleling a realism to · an idealism, and
demonstrating their identical principle. The system-prin
ciple these sections suggest seems to be the polar nature
of absolute consciousness, which attains actualization in
separate real and ideal orders, and thus makes nature and
spirit equally primary. They operate, in short, within
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The System recognizes and allows only an intuitive approach
to this transcendental logic of identity/ difference, namely through
the philosophy of art.
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the second and broader of the definitions of system dis
tinguished above.
The body of the System, comprising the general remarks
on transcendental philosophy and the theoretical and
practical deductions , is solely a system of transcendental
idealism.
"My only concern," says Schelling, "is to bring
system into my knowledge itself and to seek within know
ledge itself for that by which all individual knowing is
determined" (p. 18). Here the system-principle is "a
universal mediating factor in our knowledge" (p. 15), a
reconciliation of identical (or analytic) and synthetic
modes of thinking (pp. 22-24)--intellectual intuition.
In this context intellectual intuition is not the immediate
intuition. In this context intellectual intuition is not
the immediate ascent to the Absolute which it will be in
the Identity-System, the· holistic grasp of the totality.
Here in the System, intellectual intuition is the mode of
being of the self, of the totality of the known and knowing;
the self is said to be intellectual intuition subsistent
(pp. 27-28).
But precisely as an intuition, this intel
lectual intuition is insufficiently self-reflexive to be
both immediate and total, and thus is from the first, and
irrevocably so, sundered into unconscious production and
conscious intuition. It seems a paradoxical play of words
(and perhaps Schelling's language here is careless and
uncommunicative), 6ut intellectual intuition is an uncon
scious principle of consciousness; our awareness is always
an intuition directed back upon a production, i.e. upon a
production-intuition, an activity become objectified. In
the transcendental system proper, up to the point in the
history of consciousness whe re practical philosophy dis
solves into the action of history, no totalization of
intuition is possible. Intellectual intuition cannot be
realized except as process, as the ongoing flux of our
experiencings. Transcendental philosophy cannot ascend
to the Absolute Identity as such. The absolute synthesis,
the reconciliation of freedom and necessity, lies outside
its domain: Schelling can mention i t at the conclusion of
the practical philosophy only as a regulative idea, in
the strict Kantian sense of the term. For transcendental
idealism at least, "the opposition between conscious and
unconscious activity is necessarily an unending one"
(p. 210). As in Fichte's Science of Knowled e, an absolute
consciousness, a totalization of intellectua intuition, is
postulated as an origin and princlple of system, but is
unreachable as a result. Fichte himself explained the
incongruity of principle and of result, the abiding
difference between pure self -positing and lived synthesis,
in this fashion.
The form of the system is based on the highest
synthesis {of self and not-self, of conscious
and unconscious activity]; that there should be

1
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a system at all, on the absolute thesis [the
self-positing of the self, intellectual intui
tion} .20
The system of transcendental idealism is a system of the
forms of empirical consciousness, whose principle or
transcendental ground of_ explanation is an absolute con
sciousness. The latter simply cannot appear as an item
within the system: i t stands behind i t as a postulate.
Given Schelling's basic agreement, at least in the
body of the System, that absolute consciousness is
ineffable, it is odd, and for his future development ,
quite significant, that the work in conclusion moves
beyond the dialectic of empirical consciousness. At
this point Schelling advances a metaphysical appendix
patterned on Kant's Criti!ue of Judgment. Teleological
interpretations of natura phenomena and aesthetic intui
tion are seen t o be immediate and non-discursive approaches
to that Absolute Identity which is the ineffable origin and
unreachable goal of transcendental philosophy properly so
called (viz., the system of human knowing). Schelling
cautiously suggests that philosophy as a systematic totality
and a metascience can be completed, with a philosophy of
art serving as an approach to a pure identity-theory. For
art, as Schelling sees it, is a symbolic and necessarily
asymptotic approach to the Identity underlying all con
sciousness. The work of art is a concrete intuition of
identity-in-difference, of multiple and inexhaustible
meanings packed into one meaning; thus i t accomplishes
symbolically what philosophy attempts to do discursively-
present the totality, exhibit the Absolute. Art thus
becomes the sole concrete analogue of intellect ual intui
tion, the one place wbere producing and intuiting fully
coincide.
In this appendix, then, Schelling returns to
tbe second and broader of the definitions of system we
distinguished. He makes obvious too his abandonment of
the Fichtean principle that there is no absolute con
sciousness outside of empirical consciousness and vice
versa,21 and in so doing displays a drift toward an
absolute and objective system of philosophy, a system
again embracing ontology and overstepping the critical
transcendental cautions which would confine philosophy to
a. phenomenology of consciousness .
It is the destiny of Schelling's whole sixty year
long career in philosophy, and in a certain sense its
ruin, to again and again confront this ideal of a systema
tic and properly scientific philosophy, to put i t under
critical scrutiny, but ultimately to set i t aside and
reluctantly affirm the factual and discrete character of
20
science of Knowledge, p. 114 .
21

See The Science of Knowledge, pp. 108-9, 118.
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reality, its irreducible particularity and dispersion.
Nietzsche once suggested that it is characteristic of
modernity that a thinker cannot write the work, but must
undertake an authorship and embrace in perspective and
in series that which defies total and direct statement.
It is the tension between the leading concepts of system
and facticity which inhabits all Schelling's thought and
which makes him such a 'modern,' and from the reader's
point of view, protean and unsettled thinker.
As Schelling begins consciously to approach the
standpoint of an absolute system of reason here in the
System of Transcendental Idealism, we see the problem of
the equivocal nature of the isolated individual entity
prise as well: If everything is most truly in reason (or
in the Absolute), how does it exist outside the totality
of reason? And whence comes the extra-systematic intel
ligibility of the particular given in sensory experience?
In 1795 the young follower of Fichte had said that
there can be no leap from the absolute and systematic
perspective to that of the individual existent, no deduc
tion of the finite (S.W. I, 314).2 2 And yet he sensed
that the whole pointcir systematic philosophy is to sub
due and, as i t were, domesticate the otherness that
individuals exhibit in their contingent and mutually
external existence.
Fichte before him had pointed out
that philosophy's business is to conceptualize otherness
and bring it within the ambit of the self, but the Science
of Knowledge is ample proof of the elusive and dialectical
character of the undertaking. There Fichte is forced to
admit that the whole project seems contradictory, almost
unthinkable:
Hence if ever a difference was to enter the self
there must already have been a difference
originally in the self as, such; and this differ
ence, indeed, would have had to be grounded in
the absolute self as such.23
In the System we can already detect Schelling's pre
occupation with the factual and discrete character of
particulars and see the beginnings of his tortuous, some
times labored attempts to respect the factual in its
uncanny and pertinacious resistance to reason , and, at
the same time, to reduce the irreducibly sing ular to the
formula, and, so quantified, to include it within the
structured totality that reason articulates. The dialec
tical, perhaps antithetical, purposes motivating Schel
ling's vision of systematic philosophy become more sharply
outlined in the Identity-System, particularly after 1804.
0

22 Even in
· the Identi ty-System he maintains
·
·
th a t posi· t ion, maki ng
the finite particular an ultimate surd . Cf. s.w., VI, 38.
'

232£_. cit. , p. 240.
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The predominant tone of the S*stem,hawever, is a differ
ential respect for the indivi ual, a prizing of the con
crete over the general, a cautious realism. Many times
over in the course of the deductions, Schelling gives
prominence to a real factor over an ideal one, adopts
idealism solely as a me~hodological stance and prefers an
idealistically motivated realism which preserves the
phenomena in all their complexity over any metaphysical
idealism which would reduce and simplify the richness of
experience. For example, in the theoretical philosophy
he stresses the second limitation of the self, individuality,
and its experiential correlate, time, over the more general
limitation to intuiting intelligence and objectivity (pp.
116-17). Further he maintains that everything is at once
a priori and a posteriori; the distinction holds only
within philosophic reflection, and so all our knowledge
is empirical through and through (pp. 151-53). In the
practical philosophy he emphasizes that selfhood can be
raised to consciousness only as individual selfhood or
will; thus the crucial limitation of the self is not its
restriction to intelligence, but the third and individuating
limitation which poses the will as specified prior to its
willing, and posits the self as opposed to and determined
by the willing of other selves (pp. 165-69). It is in this
third restrictedness, individuation, that the theoretical
and practical philosophies find themselves united. For
consciousness, in its full concreteness, becomes possible
only in simultaneously confronting a definite objective
world and interacting with other selves: "Only by the
fact that there are intelligences outside me [and thus
that I am individual] does the world as such become
objective to me" (p. 173). From this focal point the
rest of the system's meditations on the paradoxes of the
concrete existence of spirit unfold, viz., that choice,
conditioned by natural inclination, is the only appearance
of freedom (p. 190); that history evidences the free
performance of an unconscious and involuntary necessity
{pp. 203 f .); that the Absolute itself, or Identity,
must be considered equally as free and as necessitated,
e qually as conscious activity and as unconscious (pp .
208-12) . Schelling the idealist shows himself every
where prepared to turn away from consciousness seeking
to grasp itself in the full transparency of thought, and
to recognize and respect instead the hard, resisting,
opaque and experientially locating features of reality.
The strange result: The idealist is forced to accord
primacy to the unconsc1ous.
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The Dominance of the Unconscious
The moment really characteristic of Schelling's
philosophizing in the S~stem of Transcendental Idealism,
the moment most in continuity with the rest of his thought,
is his insistence upon the unconscious. The principle of
system is self-consciousness--or perhaps we might better
say, setting aside the contemporary connotation of
reflexive self-awareness, self-activitf. The self qua
system-principle, and not as the delimited focus of
empirical consciousness, is originally mere activity
(p. 36). It is infinitely non-objective, non-thing-like,
for all things are thoroughly conditioned, while the
system-principle (reason demands) is to be unconditioned.
The self is thus pure inwardness (p. 26), a process and
- only derivatively a being or a state of a being. It is a
continuing self-enactment which, while indeed i t comes to
light in self-awareness, is not at all circumscribed by
it.
It is a performance not exhausted in intuition, a
(
continual energizing. The self--or, equivalently, self,
consciousness--is essentially self-constituting. Schelling \
names this self-enactment intellectual intuition.
Intellectual intuition turns out to be a paradoxical
concept. It is not properly a cognitive state and thus
bears no similarity to any intuition given in empirical
consciousness.
It is not merely an activity of, or a
faculty in, the subject; it is the subject. The self
is intellectual intuition suosistent; it exists by knowing
~ f in this -non-objective manner (p. 28) . This
'special knowing,' therefore, is more than a mere knowing.
It is, as Kant first defined the term,24 an archetypal
knowing, a knowing which constitutes as well as cognizes.
Now an infinite self or a God would transparently 'know'
in this manner, but the self which is the principle of the
system of human consciousness is (as Fichte had insisted
from the first) an absolute consciousness inside human
consciousness, and thus finite. Finitude means that
intellectual intuition is not . unitary, immediate and fully
self-reflected, that self-consciousness is not pure self
awareness.
The philosopher in his imitation of intellectual
intuition discovers a fragmented consciousness which can
be gathered back int'o itsel f only through mediation-
through experience, reflection, and finally systematic
philosophy or its surrogate, aesthetic intuition.
~
The 'special knowing,' then, which constitutes our
consciousness is at one and the same time a sundering of
the selt's activity into productive and intuitive facets
or capacities, the maintenance ' of this division as, in
24

see "On the Form of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
and Their Principles" (1770), paragraph 10.
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principle, a polar opposition, and finally, within time,
a stepwise relativization of that oppositi on in the~ies
of presentations. The self's being (or knowing, or activ
ity) is the coming-to-be of a world for it .
Self-con
sciousness is thus (1) a steady, enduring juxtaposition of
conscious (intuiting) a.ctivities and unconscious (pro
ducing) ones, of activities constitutive of subjective
awareness and worldly objectivity respectively; and (2) an
ongoing translation from unconscious over to conscious and
properly intuiting activity.
Since this self-constituting
and self-bifurcating self which is the postulate behind the
system (pp. 28, 33) does not and cannot appear in empirical
consciousness, and since it enacts itself as production
. prior to and beyond the reach of cognitive awareness, it
is largely, in fact dominantly, unconscious.
Fichte, of course, set the terms of this comparison
in the Science of Knowledge·, but he preferred not to
stress, as Schelling does, the absolute contrast between
activity (almost by definition unconscious) and awareness;
instead he sought to interpose terms connoting both affect
and effect between the two--terms like strivin~ and feeling-
and thus to effect their mediation. In grounding self-con
sciousness in an opaque activity which is 'inward' only
when internally directed and which, when directed outward,
only realizes or produces but does not illuminate,
Schelling abandons the old Cartesian ideal of consciousness
as complete ~elf-transparency. Fichte had made the same
moves, to be sure, but he was reluctant to embrace to the
full the consequences of his introduction of finitude into
the basic model of consciousness. He transposed the
absolute identity of the first ground-principle, excluded
from realization in empirical consciousness by the myster
ious persistence of the not-self, into a moral ideal. In
his hands, the failure of the "is" becomes the justifica
tion of the "ought. 11 25
Things are quite different with Schelling. There is
a frank recognition of the in principle unconscious nature
of the activity of self-constitution . It is significant
that the ultimate ascent to the Absolute which Schelling
proposes in the System is neither cognitive nor moral but
aesthetic, that it is not an eidetic intuition of some
sort, nor an intimation of transcendent value, but a
symbolic and ~reduced totality of subjective and objective
elements resi ing in the unconsciously produced work of
art, which fully reveals the nature of self-consciousness.
"[Art] ever and again continues to speak to us of what
philosophy cannot depict in external form, namely the
unconscious element in acting and producing, and its
original identity with the conscious" (p . 231). Art,
25
The Science
·
l d ge, pp . 229- 30 •
o f Knowe
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thinks Schelling, divines the unconscious and active force
.behind things and so has priority as~ philosophical
instrument over both empirical consciousness and theore
tical-reflective activity.
The idealist of 1799 who
speaks in terms of self-consciousness is really not far
from the chthonic and irrationalist philosopher of 1809
who was to say,
In the final and highest instance there is no
other being than Will. Will is primordial
Being, and all predicates .apply to i t alone-
groundlessness, eternity, independence of time,
self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only
to find this highest expression.26
In the S stem of Transcendental Idealism the uncon
scious functions as a kin o a so ute principle.
It is
the opaque knot of actuality in the self, the productive
or realizing intuition which opposes the limitant activity
(which is the self's} to its properly intuitive activity
of cognition and keeps them thus tied together. But this
productive element remains hidden, unconscious, and its
workings remain forever enigmatic (pp. 78-9). Idealism,
thinks Schelling, is forced to admit such an unconscious
production and actualization in spite of its allegiance
to self-consciousness. For i t can in no wise explain the
distinction. of inner and outer activity, i.e., of the
experiential self and the experienced 'thing,' except by
a nalogy to a kind of actualizing intelligence which loses
itself (and self-awareness) in its productions, just as
the inspired artist loses himself in his work (pp. 74-5).
In unconscious producing, real and ideal (i.e., object
constituting and object-intuiting) activities are somewhow
one; when the cpgnizing self arrives at awareness of the
product, they will be differentiated, but are as yet
unseparated. Explanation must stop at this point, for
philosophy can only postulate this unconscious producing-
the idealistic counterpart of the Kantian ultimate ground
of appearance, the thing-in-i~self--but cannot elucidate
it.
It cannot at all illuminate what i t must postulate
as the basic fact of consciousness, "the infinite tendency
of the self tobecome an object for itself," i.e., to
bound its own activity and subsequently to intuit its
boundedness as objective, existing and external to itself.
"It is not the fact that I am determinately limited which
cannot be explained, but themanner of this limitation
itself" (p. 59). The manner of this limitation--the
concretizing of the self's activity as objectivity which
productive intuition effects--is as paradoxical and
inexplicable as the self itself: an identity which is

!!!•,

26
0£ Human Freedom, tr. J. Gutmann (Chicago, 1936), p. 241
VII, 350.
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not an identity but a synthesis; a synthesis which is not
one synthesis but many syntheses packed into one; not a
timeless and immediate resolution of the infinite conflicts
of its opposed modes of activity, but an indefinitely ex
tended and ongoing partial solution (pp. 45-6, SO). The
self, which produces on~y in order to come to self-iden
tity out of antithetical opposition, can nonetheless pro
duce only as conditioned by this conflict (pp. 113-14).
Like the mysterious and dark Indifference of the Identity
System (an absolute identity somehow 'already' differen
tiated) the self-consciousness which is the principle and
subject of the system has a paradoxical and dark side,
a hidden ground which is in fact its antitype. At the
basis of self-consciousness itself is a knot of pure fact,
quite hidden from reason, viz., its origin in and ultimate
dependence upon unconscious activity.
It is this centrality of productive, activity, and
its irreducibly unconscious character, that most illu
minates the fatalism which lies at the heart of Schelling's
practical philosophy. Transcendental Idealism is a philo
sophy of praxis wherein activity everywhere predominates
over being (or previously determined activity). Yet
within the system, Schelling curiously avows, the philo
sophy of action can only show itself objectively; praxis
can appear only as history, as an objective order of
world-events, shaped and guided, perhaps, by some teleo
logical impulse toward a universal world-order (p. 4).
The subjective and personal aspect of praxis cannot appear;
the consciously guided aspect of an individual's activity,
the element of personal freed~,, cannot appear as act, but
only obliquely, as phst deed.
The sole efficacious
element in action, t e sole objectivity, is an intuiting,
and the intuiting appears not as act, but as an intuited,
an objective something. The causality of my will, so
Schelling maintains, is consumed and exhausted in the
construction/intuition of an objective world; there is no
possibility of this world's alteration.
"We act freely
and the world comes to exist independently of us" (p.
182). There is no sense of freedom other than that self
determination whereby I know (and determine the existence
of) a world: there is no efficacious altering of reality
other than my bringing it forth as a series of presentations
and cognizing it. The self, which is will and act, is
nothing other than an act of knowin<J:
"The self exists
only in that i t appears to""Ttself; its knowing is a form
of being" (p. 185 ). More than that, knowing is its only
conscious form of being; its originative (and central)
activity can be intuited only as past, as the objectivity
of a thoroughly determined world. On the level of
27
see the lengthy discussion pp. 177-88 below.
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conscious awareness, there is such a thorough-going iden
tity of acting and intuiting that freedom itself is mani
fested only as a natural phenomenon. Absolute freedom
appears objectively only as natural inclination (p. 186).
This is a thoroughly deterministic reading of the human
situation of action, one which excludes the notion of a
personal and voluntary participation in a moral order.
The System's analysis of the ethical situation explains
all ethics away, inasmuch as it makes the moral law a
subjective necessity (the purely personal ideal of total
self-determination) posed over and against the objective
necessity of inclination. The only place, consequently,
where practical activity can appear as action rather than
as response to determination is in the arbitrary choice,
whi~h is said to reconcile the conflicting subjective and
objective demands (p. 190). There is none of the Kantian
exaltation of the moral sphere here, despite the Kantian
language the analysis employs. Schelling's intent is to
move beyond the ethical, toward the global and objective
order of the self's action in history. Only insofar as
the active self or will appears, only insofar as it per
tains to the world of phenomena, as i t is conditioned in
and by empirical consciousness, can it be said to be free:
"the will itself transcends freedom" (p. 191).
An analysis of history similarly deterministic-
wherein events are patterned by the ·emergence of a drive
toward world polity, a drive which in part stems from
human cooperation but is in part impelled and necessi
tated by a h~gher providential source--moves Schelling
to adopt the notion of a hidden Absolute, an Identity
behind all conscious exercise of will which is the
reconciliation of the highest paradox, the apparent
opposition of freedom and lawfulness. The contradictions
between freedom and determinism, between the self as
intelligence and the self as will, cannot be solved on
the conscious level; an ultimate synthesis is called for,
beyond all consciousness:
sucna pre-established harmony of the objective
(or law-governed) and the determinant (or free)
is conceivable only through some higher thing,
set over them both, and which is therefore neither
intelligence nor free, but rather is the common
source of the intelligent and likewise of the free.
(P. 208)

Ultimately consciousness is put to one side and made
~ynonymous with appearance, while the hidden Absolute is
identified with the irreducibly unconscious element in s~lf
consciousness and with the essential and indissoluble
tension between the conscious and the unconscious. The
unconscious as determinant activity becomes the ground of
consciousness and of freedom, a ground never wholly to be
clarified and translated into the light of consciousness.
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A thorough-going determinism pervades the whole .r ealm of
consciousness and freedom becomes mere appearance.28
The opposition between conscious and unconscious
activity is necessarily an unending one, for were it
ever to be done away with, the appearance of freedom,
which rests entirely upon it, would be done away
with too .
(P • 21 0 )
Radical Finitude, Time and History
In the name of freedom or activity as such, freedom
of act is abrogated; on the principle of self-conscious
ness, individual consciousness is reduced to unconscious
activity--the System either veers into inconsistency and
paradox of an amateurish sort, or, more probably, points
to an essential paradox deep inthe heart of its subject
matter, human consciousness. Fichte had grappled with the
same paradox in a schematic fashion and concluded that it
is at very least odd for consciousness to be sovereignly
independent and yetfinite. Schelling, we suggest, under
takes a more detailed analysis of the finitude of conscious
ness, and, child of the Enlightenment though he is, comes
closer to voicing the radically finite nature of human
consciousness, and the precarious nature of man's career
as finite spirit, than ever his predecessor did.
In Schelling's insistence upon the unconscious nature
of the self's activity lies an essential ambiguity which
he senses, but cannot properly articulate or conceptually
resolve. The realm of unconscious activity is equated
with the transcendent principle, with an Absolute Identity,
which is said to ground all consciousness and selfhood,
but which is nonetheless "divided in the first act of
. consciousness" (p. 209). Is not the classical notion of
transcendence relativized in this equation, a notion to
which Schelling seems to adhere, especially in his talk
of system and the system-principle? A principle behind,
perhaps beneath, consciousness is made a · principle over
consciousness--in a philosophy that is nothing other than
a system of human knowledge.
Schelling cautions us, indeed, that questions about
this Identity prior to consciousness, prior to the dialec
tic of conscious and unconscious· activity, are ill-formed
and inappropriate, "for it is that which can only reveal
itself through self-consciousness, and cannot anywhere
part company from this act" (p.· 234). Nonetheless in the
historical perspective, questions do arise about the
character of its transcendence, the status of its
28The freedom, then, which .is all that supports this system of
human consciousness and is its foundation (p. 35), turns out to be a
purely formal freedom, synonymous with activity-as-such. It nowhere
partakes of the attributes of conscious awareness and decision which,
as Schelling realized in 1809 and thereafter, constitute human freedom.
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relati.ve consciousness/unconsciousness:
Is it beyond con
sciousness, like a Platonic form, or beneath consciousness
like Schopenhaue.r's primal will? Is its ineffability due
to a surpassing character or to a privative one? It is
indeed not clear from the, whole of the System whether we
are dealing here with a spiritual transcendence, a prin
ciple the classical traditions would name a cause of
knowing and being known, or with a dark and essentially
mute ground of activity or being, a ground only periph
erally and fleetingly revealed in conscious awareness.29
Schelling seems midway between a classifical philo
sophy of transcendence as seen in Plotinus or Spinoza,
where ultimate productive agency is indeed unconscious,
but unconscious in the manner of pre-eminent and trans
finite mentality, and the kind of material transcendence
of Will or Being over its finite forms, voiced by
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and in our day Heidegger. His
"unconscious activity" is certainly not the intra-psychic
and individual dynamism of conflict that Nietzsche and
Freud were to descr,ibe, the source of repression, guilt
or the life-poisoning "rancor against time." But by the
same token i t is not the conflict-free and benign princi
ple of Neoplatonic emanation, nor a placid substance beyond
knowledge, a resting and complete source of being such as
Spinoza describes.· It is an activity and a principle of
activity. It is in conflict with itself, at least
potentially, so that its life can be spoken of as the
unfolding of the infinite contradictions implicit within
it. Schelling describes it as an act which is an infinity
of actions, an absolute self-consciousness never realized
definitively and exhaustively in any conscious awareness,
but rather the life and source of the whole system of
finitude• (pp. 49-50). It is a will which realizes itself
only in the dialectic of the conscious and the unconscious,
a self-finitizing infinity.
In the System's notion of self-consciousness, the.re
fore, we have a transcendent principle curiously trans
formed and altered.
In its very self or its transcendent
aspect, absolute self-consciousness or Identity is wholly
ineffable. The mechanism explanatory of all other intui
tions, the principle of the graduated sequence of intui
tions which collectively form the system, remains obscure
and unilluminated. We do not see how the principle of
the system of human knowledge is an act of knowledge-
unless, as Schelling variously suggests, we have a vague
adumbration of i t as a genus or a type gathered from the
29
A crucial feature of Schelling's later metaphysics, begun
with Of Human Freedom (1809) and Ages of the World (1815), is the
distinction of two types of causality, the active causality of
freedom or decisive will and the kind of material-temporal priority
of antecedent over consequent which Schelling calls grounding.
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total survey of its instances, in nature as well as in
spirit (pp. 2-3), or else fashion some kind of analogy
between this supremely active and creative cognition and
the fashioning cognition of the artist lost in his work
(pp. 75, 230). We can know and recognize some kind of
absolute consciousness only in (or in between) the finite
forms of consciousness and the succession of those forms.
And what we recognize, in fact, is that there must be
something like an absolute consciousness, 1.e.~know
it as a postulate.
Schelling propounds a radically finite model of con
sciousness and (both in the spirit of Kant and on the
model of the fragmentary system of reason suggested by
the three Critiques) limits philosophical recognition to
the finite modes of knowledge, taken singly and in the
contingency of their succession in the "history of con
sciousness." Before him, Fichte had searched for an
absolute consciousness inside empirical consciousness
. and for some kind of privileged access to it, whereby
the heteronomy both of willing and of knowing would be
abrogated, and consciousness accede to total self
coincidence; The Science of Knowledge documents the ardor
of his search, and its futility. Hegel was again to take
up the task in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and with
success, for in his stipulation that the principle of
consciousness as such is a self-negating, finitizinl
return to self, rather than the Fichtean identity o
self-coincidence (I= I), he marries absolute conscious
ness and finite consciousness--and provides a principle
for the succession of its forms, a formula for their flow
and transition, a matrix for their generation.
It is
this step, the transempirical formulation of a principle
for the finitude of consciousness and for the succession
of its forms, that the System lacks--or that i t only
programmatically adumbrates. The Sfstem's self-conscious
ness is a plastic, flowing source o our knowledge and
its indwelling realization, but it escapes formula, and
thus transcends the realm of the intelligible and the
expressible. Lacking the -self-negation and self-return
that Hegel finally ascribes to consciousness, Schelling' s
self-consciousness remains a principle of activity but
not of knowledge. His self enacts the whole succession
of finite, empirical forms of subJectivity and objec
tivity without fully returning to itself, without
definitively knowing its~lf. Spirit--as Schelling was
obliged to conceive i t from the basically Fichtean stand
point of 1799--does not return to itself.
Indeed, as he
himself says,
What we speak of as nature is a poem lying pent
in a mysterious and wonderful script. Yet
the riddle could reveal itself, were we to
recognize in it the odyssey of the spirit, which,

Introduction

XXXV

marvellously deluded, seeks itself, and in seek
ing flies from itself.
(P. 232)
Yet the spirit remained deluded, locked in the forms of
finitude.
In its alienation, in its inexplicable odyssey
of self-objectification (p. 59), it can never find rest
and full return.
The self-consciousness of the Ststern, then, is a
finitized transcendence, a real andasically unspiritual
activity and source of realization such as Schelling was
to later conceive under the names 'ground' and 'unground,'
a restless, irresistible and infra-intelligible energi
zation such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were subsequently
to describe.30 Its life is essentially succession--pro
ductivity splayed forth as time or the alteration of matter
in nature, and as social mo~ement and political deed in
history--change whose ultimate rational shape or purpose
is, if admitted at all, said to be merely postulatory.
Unlike the fully self-transparent Reason of the System of
Identity and the Absolute Subject of Hegel's system, both
of which live in a kind of eternity--the eternity of move
ment completed, reality fully comprehended and rational
ized--the self-consciousness of the system of Transcen
dental Idealism is bound to time. The subject of the
Hegelian system can be said to be fully itself while it
is corning to itself, it lives its life as a play in and
among appearances. Schelling's self-consciousness, how
ever, is a principle never fully itself, never being but
only becoming, essentially dependent upon appearances
and the continued succession of appearances. For the
author of the System, the self 1 s · life is time, and not a
mathematicized interplay of eidetic shapes within time.
The finite endures and resists inclusion within any
arbitrary totalization. The odyssey of consciousness.
ends, not with any grand rationalization of the universe,
nor with the transition to any timeless and final logical
language underpinning all, but with a recognition of the
finite and fragmented textures of empirical reality and
the multiplicity of its partial intelligible schemata.
We are left with a history which equally shows
flashes of senselessness and rationality (world political
organization), whose goal and purpose cannot finally be
decided, · and whose paradoxical mixture of voluntary co
operation and external determination even philosophy can
not sort out. We are left with a philosophy insufficiently
aware of its principle to determine its own methodology,
with a philosophy lacking intellectual intuition and
depending instead . upon the surrogate of aesthetic intui
tion. We are left finally, not with a monolithic system
of human knowings, but with a multiplicity of intellectual
approaches, a multiplicity of natural languages.
30

See Of Human Freedom and'Ages of the World,
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Science, art and philosophy remain sundered, and so the
goal of fashioning one comprehensive metascience is not
accomplished. But the solution Schelling envisages to
this scandal of plurality is not to reduce and simplify.
The System has accomplished all that a general and
abstractive approach can do. What is needful now, says
Schelling, is a turn to the concrete, the fabrication of
a "new mythology,"31 the integration of the particularis
tic 'knowing' of the arts with the conceptual generality
of the sciences--a task not to be accomplished in thought
alone, or by the philosopher in isolation, but one to be
worked out by a "new race, personifying, as i t were, one
single poet," an accomplishment of history, not of
thought alone (p. 233).32
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31
A myth or its subject, the god or hero, plays the role of
a concrete universal for Schelling. Concepts indicate with empty
generality, but symbolic forms with absolute specificity. A myth
is its meaning, and all science aspires to that exactitude. See
The Philosophy of Art, s.w., v, 407-11.
32
The remark has political overtones . The 'new mythology'
might well be the ideology of the Republican polity. Compare
Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man.

